ABSTRACT. This paper starts by indicating the analysis of Hempel_s conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation (Hempel, 1945) as presented in Huber (submitted). There I argue contra Carnap (1962, Section 87) that Hempel felt the need for two concepts of confirmation: one aiming at plausible theories and another aiming at informative theories. However, he also realized that these two concepts are conflicting, and he gave up the concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. The main part of the paper consists in working out the claim that one can have Hempel_s cake and eat it too V in the sense that there is a logic of theory assessment that takes into account both of the two conflicting aspects of plausibility and informativeness. According to the semantics of this logic, a is an acceptable theory for evidence b if and only if a is both sufficiently plausible given b and sufficiently informative about b. This is spelt out in terms of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988) and shown to represent the syntactically specified notion of an assessment relation. The paper then compares these acceptability relations to explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations (Flach, 2000) as well as to nonmonotonic consequence relations (Kraus et al., 1990) . It concludes by relating the plausibility-informativeness approach to Carnap_s positive relevance account, thereby shedding new light on Carnap_s analysis as well as solving another problem of confirmation theory.
HEMPEL_S LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION
In his (1945) Hempel presents the following conditions of adequacy for any relation of confirmation j$ L Â L on some language L (I have added the name for 3.1), where ' is the classical consequence relation and FA ' B_ is short for F A f g ' B_. For any sentences E; H; H 0 2 L, 3. Consistency Condition: E f g [ H 2 L : E j$ H f g 6 ' ?.
3.1 Special Cons. C.: If E 6 ' ?, E j$ H, and H ' :H 0 , then E 6 j$ H 0 .
4. Converse Consequence Condition: If E j$ H and H 0 ' H, then E j$ H 0 .
Condition 2 entails condition 2.1; similarly for 3. Hempel then shows (Hempel, 1945, 104 ) that the conjunction of 1, 2, and 4 entails his triviality result that any two sentences confirm each other. This is clear since the conjunction of 1 and 4 implies this. By the Entailment Condition, E j$ E _ H; as H ' E _ H, the Converse Consequence Condition yields E j$ H for any sentences E; H 2 L. Since Hempel_s negative result there has hardly been any progress in developing a logic of confirmation. The exceptions I know of and to be discussed later are Flach (2000) , Milne (2000) , and Zwirn and Zwirn (1996) . One reason for this seems to be that up to now the predominant view on Hempel_s conditions is the analysis Carnap gave in Section 87 of his (1962) .
Carnap_s analysis can be summarized as follows. In presenting his first three conditions of adequacy Hempel was mixing up two distinct concepts of confirmation, viz. (a) the concept of incremental confirmation according to which E confirms H iff Pr H j E ð Þ> Pr H ð Þ, and (b) the concept of absolute confirmation according to which E confirms H iff Pr H j E ð Þ> r. The special versions of Hempel_s second and third condition, 2.1 and 3.1, respectively, hold true for the second concept (for r ! :5), but they do not hold true for the first concept. On the other hand, Hempel_s first condition holds true for the first concept, but it does so only in a qualified form (Carnap, 1962, 473 ) Y namely only if E is not assigned probability 0, and H is not assigned probability 1.
This, however, means that, according to Carnap_s analysis, Hempel first had in mind the concept of incremental confirmation for the Entailment Condition. Then he had in mind the concept of absolute confirmation for the Special Consequence and the Special Consistency Conditions 2.1 and 3.1, respectively. And then, when Hempel presented the Converse Consequence Condition, he got completely confused and had in mind still another concept of confirmation (neither the first nor the second concept satisfies the Converse Consequence Condition). Apart from not being very charitable,
Carnap_s reading of Hempel also leaves open the question what the third concept might have been.
The following two notions of the plausibility-informativeness theory (Huber, to appear) will prove useful. A relation j$ L Â L is an informativeness relation on L iff If E j$ H and H 0 ' H, then E j$ H 0 .
j$ is a plausibility relation on L iff If E j$ H and H ' H 0 , then E j$ H 0 .
The idea is that a sentence is more informative, the more possibilities it excludes. Hence, the logically stronger a sentence, the more informative it is. On the other hand, a sentence is more plausible the more possibilities it includes. Hence, the logically weaker a sentence, the more plausible it is. The qualitative counterparts of these two comparative principles are the defining clauses above. If H is informative relative to E, then so is any logically stronger sentence H 0 . Similarly, if H is plausible relative to E, then so is any logically weaker sentence H 0 . The two main approaches to confirmation that have been put forth in the last century are qualitative Hypothetico-Deductivism HD and quantitative probabilistic Inductive Logic IL. According to HD, E HDconfirms H iff H logically implies E (in some suitable way that depends on the version of HD under consideration). According to IL, E absolutely IL-confirms H to degree r iff Pr H j E ð Þ¼r. The natural qualitative counterpart of this quantitative notion is that E absolutely IL-confirms H iff Pr H j E ð Þ> r for some r 2 :5; 1 ½ Þ(this is Carnap_s second concept). As noted above, this is not the way Carnap defined qualitative ILconfirmation in chapter VII of his (1962) . There he required E to raise the probability of H, Pr H j E ð Þ> Pr H ð Þ, in order for E to qualitatively IL-confirm H. Nevertheless, the above is the natural qualitative counterpart of the degree of absolute confirmation. The reason is that later on the difference between Pr H j E ð Þ and Pr H ð Þ Y however it is measured (Fitelson, 1999) Y was taken as the degree of incremental confirmation, and Carnap_s proposal is the natural qualitative counterpart of this notion of incremental confirmation.
HD and IL explicate conflicting concepts of confirmation. HDconfirmation increases, whereas absolute IL-confirmation decreases with the logical strength of the theory to be assessed. More precisely, if E HD-confirms H and H 0 logically implies H, then E HD-confirms H 0 . So HD-confirmation is an informativeness relation. On the other hand, if E absolutely IL-confirms H (to some degree) and H logically implies H 0 , then E absolutely IL-confirms H 0 (to at least the same degree). Hence absolute IL-confirmation is a plausibility relation.
The epistemic values behind these two concepts are informativeness on the one hand and truth or plausibility on the other hand. First, we want to know what is going on Bout there^, and hence we aim at true theories Y more precisely, at theories that are true in the world we are in. Second, we want to know as much as possible about what is going on out there, and so we aim at informative theories Y more precisely, at theories that inform us about the world we are in. But usually we do not know which world we are in. All we have are some data. So we base our evaluation of the theory we are concerned with on the plausibility that the theory is true in the actual world given that the actual world makes the data true and on how much the theory informs us about the actual world given that the actual world makes the data true.
Turning back to Hempel_s conditions, note first that Carnap_s second concept satisfies the Entailment Condition without the second qualification. If E logically implies H, then Pr H j E ð Þ¼1 > r for any r 2 0; 1 ½ Þ, provided E does not have probability 0. So the following more charitable reading of Hempel seems plausible. When presenting his first three conditions, Hempel had in mind the concept of absolute confirmation, or more generally, a plausibility relation. But then, when discussing the Converse Consequence Condition, Hempel also felt the need for a second concept of confirmation aiming at informative theories. Given that it was the Converse Consequence Condition that Hempel gave up in his (1945) , the present analysis makes perfect sense of his argumentation. Though he felt the need for two concepts of confirmation, Hempel also realized that these two concepts are conflicting Y this is the content of his triviality result Y and so he abandoned informativeness in favor of plausibility.
ASSESSING THEORIES
However, in a sense one can have Hempel_s cake and eat it too. There is a logic of confirmation or theory assessment that takes into account both of these two conflicting concepts. Roughly speaking, HD says that a good theory is informative, whereas IL says that a good theory is plausible or true. The driving force behind Hempel_s conditions is the insight that a good theory is both true and informative. Hence, in assessing a given theory by the available data one should account for these two conflicting aspects.
What one does according to the plausibility-informativeness theory (Huber, to appear) is to evaluate how much theory H informs us about some piece of evidence E given a body of background information B and to evaluate how plausible H is in view of E and B. Then one combines these two values to get the overall assessment value of H in relation to E and B. Informativeness about the data is measured by a strength indicator, and plausibility given the data is measured by a truth indicator.
f is a strength indicator on L iff for all H; E; B h i , H 0 ; E; B h i2Dom f :
An assessment function measuring the overall epistemic value of theory H in light of evidence E and background information B should not be both a strength indicator and a truth indicator. Any such function is constant. This observation Y call it the singularity of simultaneously indicating strength and truth Y is the quantitative counterpart of Hempel_s triviality result. Instead, an assessment function should weigh between these two conflicting aspects in such a way that any surplus in informativeness leads to a greater overall value when the shortfall in plausibility becomes small enough.
Definition 2
Let s and t be a strength and a truth indicator on L, respectively. A possibly partial function f : L Â L Â L ! < is an s; t assessment function iff there is a possibly partial function g : < Â < Â X ! < such that (a) 1. Continuity. Any surplus in informativeness succeeds, if the shortfall in plausibility is small enough. ð Þ. This is the general plausibility-informativeness theory. Particular accounts arise by inserting particular strength indicators and truth indicators. Here I will focus on the rank-theoretic version and the logic this gives rise to. As ranking theory is closely related to, but much less well-known than probability theory, it is helpful to briefly look at the Bayesian version.
Assessing Theories, Bayes Style
In the Bayesian paradigm of subjective probabilities we get for every probability Pr on a language L the strength indicator i ¼ Pr :H j :E ð^BÞ and the truth indicator p ¼ Pr H j E^B ð Þ . For instance, the JoyceChristensen measure of incremental confirmation Joyce, 1999; Christensen, 1999) is an i; p assessment function. It can be rewritten as the expected informativeness of H relative to E and B,
For regular Pr one can show that s as well as all other i; p assessment functions lead to the most informative among all true theories in almost every world when presented data that separate the set of all models. For more on confirmation theory from the plausibility-informativeness point of view see (Huber, 2005) .
Assessing Theories, Spohn Style
The Spohnian paradigm of ranking functions (Spohn, 1988 ) is in many respects like an order-of-magnitude reverse of non-standard subjective probability theory. Ranks represent grades of disbelief. Whereas a high probability represents a high degree of belief, a high rank represents a high grade of disbelief. A function from a non-empty set of possibilities W into the set of natural numbers extended by 1, N [ 1 f g, is a pointwise ranking function on W iff ! ð Þ ¼ 0 for at least one ! 2 W . A pointwise ranking function is extended to a function % on a field of propositions A over W by defining for each A 2 A, 
If A is a '-field/complete field, % is a '-minimitive/completely minimitive ranking function iff, in addition to 1Y3, we have for every countable/possibly uncountable B A:
f g is defined such that for all A; B 2 A:
This differs from Huber (2006) , where the above equation is restricted to non-empty B and it is stipulated that % ; j A ð Þ ¼ 1for every A 2 A. The latter stipulation guarantees that % Á j A ð Þ is a ranking function for every A 2 A. The present definition renders the formulation of assessment models simpler.
If % is induced by a pointwise ranking function , then % is a completely minimitive ranking function (the converse is not true). The triple A ¼ W ; A; % h iwith W a set of possibilities, A a field over W , and % a ranking function on A is called a ranking space. A is called regular iff % is regular. 
É is consistent and deductively closed in the finite / countable / complete sense whenever % is finitely / '-/ completely minimitive. A set Bel A is consistent in the finite / countable / complete sense iff T B 6 ¼ ; for every finite / countable / possibly uncountable B Bel. Bel is deductively closed in the finite / countable / complete sense iff for every A 2 A: A 2 Bel whenever T B A for some finite / countable / possibly uncountable B Bel.
One advantage of ranking theory vis-á-vis probability theory is that it easily admits of qualitative notions as, for instance, belief. This is one reason why the logic of theory assessment Y which is based on the qualitative notion of acceptability Y is spelt out in terms of ranking functions rather than probability measures. Another reason is to illustrate the claim that the plausibility-informativeness theory is general or paradigm independent.
In order to get the rank-theoretic version of the plausibilityinformativeness theory we only have to specify a rank-theoretic strength indicator and a rank-theoretic truth indicator. This is easily achieved. For any ranking space W ; A; % h ithe plausibility rank of H relative to E and B is given by
(Remember: lower ranks indicate lower grades of disbelief.) Similarly, the informativeness rank of H relative to E and B is given by
How to measure informativeness and plausibility in ranking terms and how to combine these two values is not the task of the present paper. Here we are interested in the qualitative counterpart of the quantitative assessment value, which is the notion of an acceptable theory given the data. FAccept_ is not used in the sense of believe or hold to be true. Rather, the proposed attitude towards theories is similar to the attitude one has towards bottles of wine. One has a certain amount of money and one would like to buy a good bottle of wine. On the one hand, one wants to spend as little money as possible (one_s theory should be as plausible as possible). On the other hand, one wants to drink reasonably good wine (one_s theory should be sufficiently informative). Sometimes one need not care much about the quality of the wine, and the main focus is on the price Y like when one is concerned with several alternative theories all sufficiently informative to answer one_s questions, and one wants to choose the most plausible one. Usually, though, quality does matter. Likewise, in normal situations the most plausible theories won_t do, because they are too uninformative to answer our questions. The trade-off between price and quality characterizes a pool of candidate bottles of wine from which to choose. Call them favorable deals. For instance, a good bottle of wine for free is a favorable deal. And if a bottle of wine is a favorable deal, then so is any equally good or better bottle for the same price or less. The logic of theory assessment similarly characterizes a pool of acceptable hypotheses. For instance, a sufficiently informative theory that is certainly true is acceptable. And if a theory is acceptable, then so is any equally or more informative theory that is equally or more plausible.
Neglecting the background information B, it is tempting to say that H is an acceptable theory for evidence E iff the overall assessment value of H relative to E is greater than that of its complement H relative to E. This, however, has the consequence that the notion of acceptability depends on the way one combines plausibility and informativeness. One may, for instance, simply take the sum s þ t À 1, or else one may judge informativeness measured by s more important than plausibility measured by t and stick with s þ t x À 1, for some x > 1. The only clear case in which H is acceptable given E is when H is at least as plausible given E as its complement H, and H informs more about E than does H; or else, H is more plausible given E than H, and H informs at least as much about E as does H. This will be our definition of acceptability.
THE LOGIC OF THEORY ASSESSMENT

Assessment Models
Let us do some stage setting. A language L is a countable set of closed well-formed formulas that contains ? and is closed under the propositional connectives : and^(_, !, $ are defined as usual). A language is not required to be closed under the quantifiers. Mod L is the set of all models for L. If L is a propositional language over the set of propositional variables PV , Mod L is the set of all truth value assignments ! : PV ! 0; 1 f g. If L is a first-order language, Mod L is the set of all pairs D; ' h i with D a non-empty set and ' an interpretation function. ' assigns every k-ary predicate symbol FP_ a subset ' F ð P_Þ D k THE LOGIC OF THEORY ASSESSMENT (' F ð p_Þ 2 0; 1 f g for propositional variables Fp_ conceived of as 0-ary predicate symbols), and every k-ary function symbol Ff _ a function
Mod Â L is the classical satisfaction relation, and for 2 L, Mod
is compact Y a set of wffs is satisfiable iff all its finite subsets are Y and such that ! iff ! 6 : and Mod ^ ð Þ¼Mod ð Þ \ Mod ð Þ. If every ! 2 Mod L that satisfies all wffs 2 À also satisfies , we write FÀ _. F _ is short for F f g _, and F _ is short for F; _. 
By the definition of conditional ranking functions (Section 2.2) this is equivalent to
If one prefers the definition of conditional ranking functions from (Huber, 2006) , the second clause is our definition of acceptability relations. In words: is an acceptable theory for iff is at least as plausible given as its negation, and informs more about than does :; or is more plausible given than its negation, and informs at least as much about as does :.
In the following we employ the Gabbay-Makinson-KLM framework (Gabbay, 1985 , Makinson, 1989 , Kraus et al., 1990 and present a list of properties such that the acceptability relation j$ % defined by an assessment model for a language L satisfies these properties (correct-ness). Then we show that the converse is also true. For each relation j$ L Â L on some language L satisfying these properties there is an assessment model Y in fact, a pointwise assessment model Y W ; A; % h i for L such that j$ ¼ j$ % (completeness).
Assessment Relations
A relation j$ L Â L is an assessment relation on the language L iff:
The * -starred principles are among the core principles in Zwirn and Zwirn (1996) . A5 is different from Milne_s Negation Symmetry (Milne, 2000) . It has to hold of any acceptability relation j$ % given the definition in Section 3.1. The plausibility value of given is the informativeness value of : given :, and the informativeness value of given is the plausibility value of : given :. Hence, if the plausibility and the informativeness of relative to are both at least as great as that of : given , and one, say plausibility, is strictly greater, then the plausibility and the informativeness of : relative to : are both at least as great as that of given :, and the other, informativeness, is strictly greater. It is helpful to note that for non-tautological _ , _ j$ means that the rank of is not greater than the rank of , or equivalently, that the rank of is not greater than, and hence equal to, the rank of _ . For tautological _ , _ j$ means that the rank of is strictly smaller than that of its negation :, which holds iff : has a rank greater than 0.
In terms of acceptability A6 says that at least one of ; is acceptable given non-tautological _ . Both and inform maximally about _ , and if not , then at least must be at least as plausible given _ as its negation :. By the above meaning of _ j$ for nontautological _ , A6 amounts to the connectedness of the -relation between natural numbers. Either the rank of is not greater than that of , or the rank of is not greater than that of .
The antecedent of A7 simply says that the rank of is greater than 0. This is also the meaning of the consequent.
By A5 the first antecedent of A8 says that the rank of is greater than 0. For non-tautological _ the second antecedent means that the rank of is not greater than the rank of . Hence the consequent that the rank of is positive. For tautological _ the second antecedent means that the rank of : is greater than 0 Y which is not possible, because at least one of ; : must have rank 0.
For tautological A9 is an instance of the derived rule Selectivity (see below). For non-tautological the first antecedent means that the rank of ^ is not greater than the rank of ^:. By A5 the second antecedent means that the rank of :^: is not greater than the rank of :^. Hence : is neither more plausible given than its negation; nor is it more informative about than its negation. This implies the consequent of A9.
The first and third antecedent of A10 together say that ^: has a greater rank than ^. The second antecedent implies that the rank of :^: is not greater than the rank of :^. Therefore is more plausible given than :, and it is at least as informative about as :. This implies the consequent. The proof below only requires the weaker version including the fourth antecedent.
quasi-Nr 21 without the restriction 6 ' _ is the derived rule (21) of the system P in Kraus et al. (1990) (cf. their lemma 22) . Together with supplementary-Nr 21 it expresses the transitivity of the -relation between natural numbers. If the rank of is not greater than the rank of (for non-tautological _ ) or the rank of is 0 (for tautological _ ), and if the rank of is not greater than the rank of (for nontautological _ ) or the rank of , and hence that of , equals 0, then the rank of is not greater than that of .
A13a says that the range of ranking functions is well-ordered. There is no strictly G -decreasing sequence of natural numbers. A13b says that only inconsistent formulas have an infinite rank.
1
Here are some derived rules:
Selectivity * A16. ' ) _ j$ A17. _ : j$ ; ' ) _ : j$ As to Weak _-Composition, j$ , A5, and Weak Composition first give us : j$ :^: and then j$ _ . As to Selectivity, j$ and Weak Composition and Weak _-Composition yield j$ ^ and j$ _ . Apply A9. As to A16, if ' , then _ a' . Apply Reflexivity and Left Logical Equivalence. As to A17, ' yields : ' :, which yields : _ : j$ : by A16. _ : j$ , A5, and Left Logical Equivalence yield :^:: j$ :. A8 gives us :^:: j$ :, and A5, Left Logical Equivalence, and Right Logical Equivalence give us _ : j$ .
Note that Selectivity allows there to be two logically incompatible theories 1 and 2 such that both are acceptable given (cf. Carnap_s discussion of Hempel_s consistency condition quoted in Huber, submitted, section 2).
A Representation Result
Theorem 1 (Representation Theorem for Assessment Relations) The acceptability relationj$ % induced by an assessment model W ; A; % h ifor a language L is an assessment relation on L. For each assessment relation j$ on a language L there is a pointwise assessment model
Proof The proof is restricted to the second claim. The plan is as follows. We first define a countable field A on Mod L . Using only the assessment relation j$ on L we then define a weak order " on A. We go on to show that for each such weak order " on A there is a regular ranking function % on A such that % represents ", i.e.
This is done by showing that " gives rise to a well-order on the set of equivalence classes A= ' , where ' is the equivalence relation on A induced by " (A ' B iff A " B and B " A). A13b guarantees that the order type of this well-order is not greater than the first limit ordinal !. Therefore we can write the elements of A= ' as a sequence. We use the indices of this sequence as the values of %. Finally we show that j$ iff
Þ , where at least one of these inequalities is strict, and % L is the ranking on L that is induced by % on A. In fact, % on A is the pre-ranking induced by % L on L. The Extension Theorem for Rankings on Languages (Huber, 2006) completes the proof by ensuring that there is a pointwise ranking function on
So suppose j$ L Â L is an assessment relation on the language L. 
Subproof This is easily seen by keeping in mind that 
As A \ B 6 ¼ ; and % is regular, we get % A \ B À Á G % ; ð Þ. So the above holds iff
i.e. just in case
For A; B 2 A with A \ B ¼ ;, equivalence (1) reduces to
As % A ð Þ % A À Á iff % A ð Þ ¼ 0, we have for A; B 2 A with A \ B ¼ ;: We have to show that " is connected and transitive.
Subproof
As to Connectedness, suppose A 6 " B, for some A ¼ Mod 
Ì
So we have defined a weak order " A Â A in terms of j$. As a consequence, ' A Â A, where
is an equivalence relation over A, i.e. a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive binary relation over A. Another immediate consequence is that 0 A Â A, where
is asymmetric (if A 0 B, then B 6 0 A) and transitive. As third corollary we note that A= ' ; " ' is a simple order, where for
That A= ' ; " ' is a simple order means that A= ' ; " ' is a weak order (connected and transitive) that is antisymmetric: if A ½ " ' B ½ and
So the elements A ½ of A= ' partition A. We will now show that A= ' ; " ' is a well-order, i.e.
Reflexivity:
As Reflexivity follows from Connectedness, we only have to show Minimum. It suffices to show that there is no strictly 0 ' -decreasing sequence E n ð Þ n2N of elements E n 2 A= ' , where for each n 2 N there is an A 2 A such that E n ¼ A ½ . Before doing so, note the following useful properties: 
Ì
Now suppose there is a strictly 0 ' -decreasing sequence E n ð Þ n2N of equivalence classes E n 2 A= ' :
For each equivalence class E n there is a representative A n 2 A and a wff 0 n 2 L such that E n ¼ A n ½ and A n ¼ Mod 
This, however, contradicts A13a, according to which there is an n 2 N such that for all m ! n, m 2 N :
has an order type ord A ¼ #. A basic fact about well-orders says that every well-ordered set of type # 6 ¼ 0 is isomorphic to the set of all ordinal numbers " with 0 "G# (ordered according to their magnitude). An argument similar to the preceding one shows that A13b implies that the order type of A cannot be greater than the first limit ordinal !. Hence we can write the elements of A= ' as a sequence
Given this we define for every non-empty
In this way every Mod ð Þ 2 A gets its rank % Mod ð Þ ð Þ, and we only have to show that % is a regular ranking function. This is easily done by using the useful properties.
ð Þ for every non-empty A 2 A. By Connectedness, A " B or B " A for all A; B 2 A. In the first case (4) yields A ' A [ B. In the second case (4) yields 
we have A \ B " A \ B, and so
. A similar argument applies in case A ¼ ;. So assume both A and A are not empty. Then
It remains to be shown that at least one of these inequalities is strict. The assumption j$ and Right Logical Equivalence yield j$ ::. By A9 Left Logical Equivalence, A5, and Right Logical Equivalence give us 6 j$ ^:; j$ _ ; 6 ' ; 6 ' ?;
and A10 yields j$ .
Ì
By the Extension Theorem for Rankings on Languages (Huber, 2006) there exists a unique minimal pointwise ranking function on Mod L such that
COMPARISONS AND FURTHER (NON-) PRINCIPLES
The papers developing a logic of confirmation I have come across are Flach (2000) , Milne (2000) , and Zwirn and Zwirn (1996) . Zwirn and Zwirn (1996) argue that there is no unified logic of confirmation taking into account all of the partly conflicting aspects of confirmation. Flach (2000) argues that there are two logics of Binduction^, as he calls it, viz. confirmatory and explicatory induction (corresponding to Hempel_s conditions 1Y3 and 4, respectively). Milne (2000) argues that there is a logic of confirmation Y namely the logic of positive probabilistic relevance Y but that it does not deserve to be called a logic.
We have already seen some of the principles of Zwirn and Zwirn (1996) . Below the present approach is compared to Flach_s explanatory and confirmatory consequence relations and the nonmonotonic consequence relations of Kraus et al. (1990) . Before doing so let us consider the remaining principles of Zwirn and Zwirn (1996) and a few further ones. The following are admissible:
A18. 6 ' ? ) 6 j$ ^: Consistency * A19. 6 ' ) 6 j$ _ :
As indicated by the * -star, Consistency is one of the core principles of Zwirn and Zwirn (1996) Y as is Z-Selectivity, viz. Selectivity restricted to consistent on the left hand side (Z-Selectivity is, of course, also admissible). Ampliativity I is one direction of Ampliativity (Zwirn and Zwirn, 1996, 201) . Among the principles of Zwirn and Zwirn (1996) not discussed below are the following inadmissible ones (I use roman numerals for non-principles):
The Levi Principle requires, among other things, that all verified theories are treated the same. It is clear that this does not hold for acceptability, because not all verified theories are as uninformative as tautological theories. Given Carnap_s discussion of Hempel_s Special Consistency Condition 3.1 (quoted in Huber, submitted, section 2), it is particularly interesting to observe that iv. j$ ; ' : ) 6 j$ Strong Selectivity is not admissible.
Explanatory and Confirmatory Consequence Relations
According to (Flach, 2000, 167ff) any inductive consequence relation satisfies Left Logical Equivalence, Right Logical Equivalence, Verification, Left Reflexivity, Right Reflexivity, Right Extension, and Falsification (this is indicated by the superscript FI_). F-Consistency (called Consistency by Flach, 2000, 168) is equivalent to Falsification, given Left Logical Equivalence (Flach, 2000, Lemma 1) . Hence it is also satisfied by any inductive consequence relation (the additional superscript Fd_ indicates that it is a derived principle).
A2
.
IÀd ' : ) 6 j$ F-Consistency
These principles hold for acceptability relations, if Falsification and F-Consistency are weakended to quasi-Falsification and quasi-F-Consistency, respectively.
A28.
IÀd j$ ; ^ ' ; 6 ' ) ^: 6 j $ quasi-Falsification A29.
IÀd ' :; 6 ' : ) 6 j $ quasi-F-Consistency Left Reflexivity and Right Reflexivity are unconditionally satisfied by acceptability relations. In Flach (2000) the antecedents ensure that and are consistent. Among inductive consequence relations Flach distinguishes between consequence relations for explanatory induction and for confirmatory induction. Explanatory induction j$ is semantically characterised by defining j$ W iff (a) there is an ! 2 W such that ! , and (b) for all ! 2 W : ! ! , where W is a subset of the set of all models Mod L for the propositional language L and Mod L Â L is a compact satisfaction relation.
Explanatory induction thus focuses more or less exclusively (apart from requiring to be W -consistent) on the logical strength of . It satisfies all THE LOGIC OF THEORY ASSESSMENT principles for inductive consequence relations and is syntactically characterised (indicated by the superscript FE_) by Explanatory Reflexivity, Left Consistency, Admissible Right Strengthening, Cautious Monotonicity (called Incrementality by Flach, 2000, 172) , Predictive Convergence, and Conditionalisation. In addition, it satisfies Admissible Converse Entailment, Consistent Right Strengthening, and Convergence.
A30.
E j$ ; : 6 j$ ) j$ Explanatory Reflexivity A31.
EÀd j$ ; ' ) j$ Admissible Converse Entailment xii.
EÀd j$ ; : 6 j$ ) j$ ^ Consistent Right Strengthening xiii.
EÀd ' ; j$ ) j$ Convergence 
Given a confirmatory structure W , the closed confirmatory consequence relationj$ W defined by W is the usual KLM consequence relation with the additional requirement that be consistent in the sense of Á ½ , i.e. j$ W iff ; 6 ¼ ½ k k. Closed confirmatory induction thus focuses more or less exclusively (apart from requiring to be Á ½ -consistent) on the logical weakness of . Simple confirmatory consequence relations are syntactically characterised (indicated by the superscript FSC_) by Selectivity (called Right Consistency by Flach, 2000, 179) , Right And (called And in Kraus et al., 1990, 179, and called Composition in Zwirn and Zwirn, 1996, 201) , and Cut (called Predictive Right Weakening by Flach, 2000, 178) . In addition, simple confirmatory consequence relations satisfy Right Weakening (called Consequence in Zwirn and Zwirn, 1996, 201) and its instance Admissible Entailment.
A15.
SC j$ ) 6 j $ : Selectivity * xii.
SC j$ ; j$ ) j$ ^ Right And xiii.
SC j$ ; ^ ' ) j$ Cut xiv.
SCÀd j$ ; ' ) j$ Right Weakening (Right Monotonicity) xv.
SCÀd j$ ; ' ) j$ Admissible Entailment
As simple confirmatory consequence relations violate Left Logical Equivalence, Verification, and Right Reflexivity, they are no inductive consequence relations (though they satisfy Right Logical Equivalence, Falsification, Left Reflexivity, Right Extension, and F-Consistency). W ¼ S; l; 0 h iis a preferential structure (Kraus et al., 1990) iff l is a function from S into Mod L , and 0 is a strict partial order on S such that for all 2 L and all t 2 b ¼ s 2 S : l s ð Þ f g : t is minimal w.r.t. 0, or there is an s 2 S which is minimal in b and such that s 0 t. A preferential structure W ¼ S; l; 0 h i induces a preferential confirmatory structure by defining:
Every preferential confirmatory structure is a simple confirmatory structure. Preferential confirmatory consequence relations, i.e. consequence relations j$ W with W a preferential confirmatory structure, satisfy all principles for inductive consequence relations. They are syntactically characterised (indicated by the superscript FPC_) by Selectivity, Right And, Cut, and, in addition, Left Logical Equivalence, Confirmatory Reflexivity, Left Or (called Or in Kraus et al., 1990, 190) , and Strong Verification.
PC j$ ) 6 j $ : Selectivity * xii.
PC j$ ; j$ ) j$ ^ Right And xiii.
PC j$ ; ^ ' ) j$ Cut A2.
PC j$ ; a' ) j$ Left Logical Equivalence * A32.
PC j$ ; 6 j$ : ) j$ Confirmatory Reflexivity xvi. viii.
OCC ^ ' ; j$ ) j$ Predictive Convergence xiii.
OCC j$ ; ^ ' ) j$ Cut xviii.
OCC ' : ) 6 j$ F-Consistency xix.
OCC _ j$ ; 6 j$ ) j$
Disjunctive Rationality
As open classical confirmatory induction satisfies both Predictive Convergence and Cut, it somehow combines aspects of explanatory induction on the one hand and confirmatory induction on the other hand. However, the resulting system is so weak that just about anything goes. After all, only logically incompatible sentences do not confirm each other. In contrast to this the combination of the plausibility and informativeness aspects achieved by acceptability relations is much more stringent. In order for to be a possible inductive consequence of , must be at least as plausible given as and more informative about than its negation :, or must be more plausible given than and at least as informative about as its negation :.
Nonmonotonic Consequence Relations
The following principles from Kraus et al. (1990) are satisfied by acceptability relations.
A33. j$ ! ; j$ ) j$ MPC A34. 0 j$ 1 ; . . . ; kÀ1 j$ k ; k j$ 0 ) 0 j$ k Loop A35. ^ j$ ; ^: j$ ) j$ Proof by Cases, D
The following principles are not admissible (xxYxxii are mentioned in both Kraus et al., 1990 and in Zwirn and Zwirn, 1996) . Supraclassicality is again one of the core principles of Zwirn and Zwirn (1996) (hence the * -star), and the numbers refer to the numbering in Kraus et al. (1990) .
xx. ' ) j$ Entailment, Supraclassicality * xxi. ' ) j$ Conversion xxii. j$ ) : j$ : Contraposition xxiii. j$ ! ) ^ j$ EHD xxiv. j$ ; j$ ) j$ Transitivity xxv. j$ ; j$ ; j$ ) j$ Equivalence xxvi. ^ j$ ) j$ ! S xxvii. j$ ) ^ j$ or ^: j$ Negation Rationality xxviii. j$ ) ^ j$ or j$ : Rational Monotonicity xxix. _ j$ ; j$ ) _ j$ Nr 9 xxx. 0 j$ 1 ; . . . ; k j$ kÀ1 ; k j$ 0 ) 0 j$ k Nr 15 xxxi. j$ ; j$ ) _ j$ _ Nr 19 xxxii. _ j$ ; j$ ) j$ ! Nr 20
xxxiii. _ j$ ; _ j$ ) _ j$ Nr 21 xxxiv. _ j$ ; _ j$ ) j$ ! Nr 22
The violation of the following principle (called Monotonicity in Kraus et al., 1990, 180) means that acceptability relations are not monotonic.
xxxv. j$ ; ' ) j$ Left Monotonicity
As already observed in the previous subsection, acceptability relations are genuinely nonmonotonic in the sense that they also violate Right Monotonicity.
xv. j$ ; ' ) j$ Right Monotonicity, Right Weakening
So not only arbitrary strengthening of the premises, but also arbitrary weakening of the conclusion is not allowed. The reason is this. By arbitrarily weakening the conclusion information is lost Y and the less informative conclusion might not be worth taking the risk of being led to a false conclusion. The logic of theory assessment can also answer the question why everyday reasoning is satisfied with a standard that is weaker than truthpreservation in all possible worlds, and thus runs the risk of being led to a false conclusion. We are willing to take this risk, because we want to arrive at informative conclusions that go beyond the premises. However, as the relation of positive probabilistic relevance, acceptability relations are no proper consequence relations in the sense that their semantics is not in terms of the preservation of a particular property.
CARNAP_S ANALYSIS REVISITED
In conclusion let us turn back to Carnap_s analysis of Hempel_s conditions and his claim that Hempel was mixing up absolute and incremental confirmation. As argued in Huber (submitted, sections 2Y4), Carnap_s analysis is neither charitable nor illuminating. The plausibilityinformativeness theory provides a more charitable interpretation that is illuminating by accounting for Hempel_s triviality result and his rejection of the Converse Consequence Condition. It is nevertheless interesting to consider the relation between Carnap_s favorite concept of qualitative confirmation Y viz. positive relevance in the sense of a regular probability measure Y and our acceptability relations leading to plausibleI was a member of the Philosophy, Probability, and Modeling group at the Center for Junior Research Fellows at the University of Konstanz.
